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Abstract
We show a simple way to introduce monopolistic competition in a general equi-
librium model where prices are fully exible, the velocity of money is variable and
cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints occasionally bind.We establish the conditions under
which money has real e¤ects and demonstrate that an equilibrium that occurs at a
binding CIA constraint is welfare inferior to any equilibrium that occurs at a non-
binding CIA constraint with the same level of technology. We argue that even though
the probability of a binding CIA constraint can be increasing with money supply, under
certain conditions, expansionary money supply is welfare improving.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we introduce and analyze an analytically tractable cash-in-advance (CIA)
general equilibrium model populated by risk-neutral monopolists and risk averse workers.
We show that the CIA constraint is occasionally binding, depending on both the current state
of the economy and the expectation about the future state of the economy. We demonstrate
the real e¤ects of money without requiring the presence of other physical assets.1 We argue
that even when money is the only asset in the economy, monetary policy is non-trivial.
Cooley and Hansen (1989), introduce a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint in a stochastic
optimal growth model with capital, endogenous indivisible labor and perfectly competitive
markets.2 Assuming that the CIA constraint always binds, they nd that the impact of
money on real quantities is small at business cycle frequencies whereas the impact is signi-
cantly large in the long-run.3 While unanticipated ination has no role, anticipated ination
induces a considerable e¤ect on real variables at the steady state.4 Note that whether the
1As noted by Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984), a standard argument for money non-neutrality in a
general equilibrium framework lies on the existence of other real assets. Changes in money supply a¤ect the
price level which in turn a¤ects the return of money as an asset relative to the other physical assets. As a
result, individuals realign their portfolios and the equilibrium holdings of physical assets change.
2Svensson (1985), intoduced money via a CIA constraint in a general equilibrium model where other
nancial assets are also traded. Due to the absence of physical capital, the equilibrium consumption always
equals output which is specied as a stochastic endowment process. In such setting, it is unclear whether
output is dependent or independent of monetary expansion. His model is di¤erentiated from that of Lucas
(1982) in that consumers decide on their cash balances before they know the current state of nature and
hence before they know their consumption. This feature leads to potential variation in the velocity of money
as the CIA constraint is sometimes non-binding.
3The impact of money on real variables results from the ination tax. That is, increases in the growth
rate of money lead agents to expect higher ination. The positive ination tax on the consumption good
induces agents to lower work e¤ort and as a result, output and consumption. In other words, the agents
substitute away from activities that involve the use of cash (consumption good) in favor of activities that do
not require cash (leisure). Among others, Cooley and Hansen (1995, 1997) adopt a similar framework.
4In other words, the agents substitute away from activities that involve the use of cash (consumption
good) in favor of activities that do not require cash (leisure). Among others, Cooley and Hansen (1995, 1997)
adopt a similar framework.
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CIA constraint binds or not is independent of the presence of capital. Another strand of the
literature focusses on nominal rigidities of one kind or another which result in real e¤ects of
monetary policy in the short-run.5
In this paper we o¤er an alternative general equilibrium framework of a CIA economy
where output is produced by monopolistic rms. Specically, risk averse workers supply labor
and risk-neutral monopolists set prices and produce output (the labor market is competitive).
To keep our analysis simple and tractable and since our objective is to examine the qualitative
aspects of money rather than to match features of the data, we abstact from the presence
of physical assets such as capital. We allow for a very general set of possibilities about how
the velocity of money is determined. We show that velocity has an upper bounded which is
decreasing with the elasticity of demand of the consumption good (increasing in the markup
of marginal productivity over the real wage). There are two main sources of uncertainty, one
associated with random technology innovations and the other with random money transfers.
Money tranfers take place at the beginning of the period whereas technology innovations
are revealed at the end of the period. The state vector consists of a technology innovation,
money balances and a velocity specic-shock. As Cooley and Hansen (1989), suggest in their
conclusion (p 746), ... the most important inuence of money on short-run uctuations are
likely to stem from the inuence of the money supply process on expectations of relative
prices. Here, we establish this argument analytically. When particular state vectors occur,
the CIA constraint binds because the agents expect that the value of money will decrease
next period (i.e the expected discounted relative price will rise). As a result, they rush to
5This is the case in the neoclassical synthesis framework (e.g. Don Patinkin 1956) and also the new
neoclassical synthesis (e.g. Woodford 2003).
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spend all their money holdings the current period which leads to an increase in the velocity
of money to the extent that it hits its upper bound. We demonstrate that in this case, there
is a unique equilibrium where money induces real e¤ects: equilibrium output, consumption,
work e¤ort and real prots are functions of money balances as well as the expectations for
future money transfers, technology innovations and velocity-specic shocks. This result does
not require any sort of nominal rigidity or the presence of other physical assets.
When the expected value of money equals its current value (i.e the expected discounted
relative price remains unchanged), the CIA constraint does not bind because the consumers
are indi¤erent between spending a unit of money today and holding it for one period. We
demonstrate that in this case there is a unique equilibrium where money does not a¤ect real
quantities. In other words, real variables are driven only by current technology innovations,
whereas money transfers and velocity-specic shocks only a¤ect the price level. Unlike the
case of a binding CIA constraint, the price level does not depend on expectations about
future technology innovations and money transfers. We also show that the equilibrium at a
binding CIA constraint is inferior (in terms of current welfare) to any equilibrium with the
same level of technology that occurs at a non-binding CIA constraint.
The problem of the monetary authority is not modeled explicitly and money transfers are
treated as random variables (with a known distribution) by rm owners and consumers. For
illustrative purposes we assume that the velocity of circulation is an increasing function of
technology and money transfers. Then, an increase of money supply increases the probability
of a binding CIA constraint. We argue that the monetary authority would not necessarily
avoid expansionary money supply because, as we show, there are cases where it might be
4
welfare improving. When the monetary authority decides the transfer of money, neither the
technology innovation nor the velocity-specic shock are known. Therefore, the transfer may
be optimal ex-ante based on current information and expectations but not optimal ex post,
after technology and velocity shocks are revealed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the economic
environment which includes the problem of the rms, the problem of the workers and the
analysis of the equilibrium conditions. In section 3 we provide an example of welfare im-
proving expansionary money supply while conclusions are presented in section 4.
2 Model Economy
The economy is populated by risk averse workers and monopolistic rms which are owned by
risk-neutral entrepreuneurs. There are incomplete nancial markets which mean that there
is no source of insurance for workers. There is a perfectly competitive labor market and a
goods market where the workers and the rms trade labor services and the nal good. The
agents exchange goods and labor services using cash which is the only medium of exchange.
As the quantity theory of money indicates, at the aggregate level, nominal output varies
with the nominal money balances times its velocity that is,
Ptyt M tqt (1)
where Pt is the aggregate price level, yt is aggregate real output, M t is the total quantity of
money and qt is the velocity of money. This is an identity which we can think of as dening
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the velocity qt. The velocity of money is not a choice variable of a single agent but it is
rather determined at the aggregate level.
2.1 Firms
There is a number n > 1 of rms, each producing a good xi  0, i = 1, :::, n. The rms are
managed by risk-neutral entrepreneurs that consume the rmsprots. The price for good
i is denoted by p (xi), where p0 ()  0 and p00 ()  0, while the n-vector of prices is denoted
by p 2 <n+ and general price level P : <n+ ! <+. The rm produces output by employing a
xed numberm  1 of workers, each providing hi hours of work, via technology xi (hi;m; i),
where x0i () > 0 and x00i ()  0. i > 0 is an exogenous productivity shock. The latter is
distributed according to the conditional p.d.f. #
e; 0 for e 2   <+ where the 0 denotes
the previous period realized value of . The objective function of rm i can be written as
i = p (xi)xi   Pwmhi (2)
where i are prots and w is the real hourly wage rate. The problem of the rm is to
maximize its prots by choosing hours, taking as given the aggregate price level and the real
hourly wage rate. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for prot maximization is
x0i [p
0 (xi)xi + p (xi)] = Pwm (3)
In our analysis, we assume that rms employ the same technology and thereby, i = .
To obtain an analytical solution we assume that the technology is described by the linear
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production function xi (hi;m; ) = mhi. The inverse demand for good i is also linear and
of the form
pi = A Bxi
where A > 0 and B > 0. The demand function is a special case generated from a class of
linear- homothetic (LH) preferences6. The aggregate price level is dened as
P (p) = +  (  s) (4)
 =
Pn
i=1 pi
n
, s =
Pn
i=1 p
2
i
n
 1
2
where  > 1 ( is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand when prices are equal).
Notice that (4) implies that when all prices are equal then, pi = s =  = P . Coe¢ cients A
and B correspond to
A =
1 + 

s , B =
snP
Y
where Y denotes the economys total nominal expenditure. Hence we can solve (3) for labor
demand function, nominal price and prots:
h =
1
2Bm
h
A  P w

i
(5)
pi =
1
2
h
A+
w

P
i
(6)
i =
1
4B
h
A  P w

i2
(7)
6See Datta and Dixon (2000, 2001) :
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Since rms face the same technology shock  and there are no frictions in the economy, the
equilibrium will be symmetric. In other words, in equilibrium all rms will set their price
equal to P . Thus, the individual product demand reduces to an expression of aggregate real
output, y = nx, where y = Y=P . Then, condition (6) reduces to
w =
   1

 (8)
(8) is the simple condition that the real wage is the marginal product of labor times the
inverse of the markup. Condition (5) reduces to
hd =
y
nm
(9)
where hd denotes labor demand. Finally, real prots reduce to
 =
y
n
(10)
where  = =P .
2.2 Worker-Consumers
Time is discrete and innite, t 2 Z+ = f1; 2:::1g. There are (n x m) identical worker-
consumers with preferences over leisure, l, and consumption, c. The utility function is given
by u (ct; lt) = ln ct +  ln lt where  > 0. Each worker-consumer is endowed with one unit of
time which is split between work and leisure that is, l + h = 1.
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The consumers wealth constraint is given by
M ct+1 + Ptct =M
c
t + t + Ptwtht (11)
whereM c are the consumers nominal money holdings and  is a money increase or decrease
such that M c > jj. The transfer t is made at the end of period t   1 and before t is
realized. It takes a while for the transfer to be completed but the timing is such that the
money is availabe at the beginning of the period. Consumers treat  as a random variable
that is distributed according to  (e;  0) for e 2 N where  0 denotes the previous period
transfer and N = fe 2 < :  +M c > 0g. The consumer receives her labor earnings at the
end of the period but purchases consumption at the beginning of the period. As a result,
she faces a cash-in-advance constraint:
Ptct M ct + t (12)
The problem of the consumer is to choose consumption, labor supply and money balances
to maximize utility subject to the budget contraint and the CIA constraint. We will say
that the CIA is binding whenever Ptct = M ct + t. It is weakly binding when the household
does not wish to consume more; it is strictly binding when the household is constrained to
consume less than it would like to in the absence of the CIA.
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The Lagrangian function, L, associated with the consumers problem is the following:
L =P1t=0 tEt u (ct; lt)  1t M ct+1 + Ptct  M ct   t   Ptwtht
 2t [Ptct  M ct   t]g
where  is the discount factor, it is the shadow price of the standard budget constraint and
2t is the shadow price of the CIA constraint.
This yields the following necessary and su¢ cient rst-order conditions:
uc (ct; lt) = 1tPt + 2tPt (13)
ul (ct; lt) = 1tPtwt (14)
1t = Et f1t+1 + 2t+1g (15)
Notice that in equilibrium, M ct =Mt. Combining (13), (14) and (15) yields
ul (ct; lt)
wt
= Et

uc (ct+1; lt+1)
1 + inft+1

where inft denotes the ination rate in period t. If the CIA constraint does not bind or is
only weakly binding in period t (2t = 0), the left-hand side of the above condition is also
equal to the marginal utility of consumption, which implies that the marginal benet of work
will equal the marginal cost of work, i.e uc (ct; lt) wt = ul (ct; lt). On the other hand, if the
CIA constraint is strictly binding (2t > 0) then the marginal benet of work will be greater
than the marginal cost of work, i.e uc (ct; lt) wt > ul (ct; lt). Using the fact that utility is
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separable in consumption and leisure, it is straightforward to show that
Et

uc (ct+1)
uc (ct)

1
1 + inft+1
8>><>>:
< 1, binding CIA constraint
= 1, nonbinding CIA constraint
(16)
The term [1= (1 + inft+1)] is the gross return of money, RMt+1  1 + rMt+1.7 The left hand side
of the above condition can also be written as Et

 t+1R
M
t+1

, where  t+1 is the stochastic
discount factor or pricing kernel which is equal to the intertemporal rate of substiturion
(IRS) between next period consumption and current consumption. The term on the left
hand side of (16) is the expected return of money measured in next periods utility per unit
of current utility. When the expected return of a unit of money measured in next periods
utility units is the same as the value of a unit of money measured in current utility units
(i.e Et

 t+1R
M
t+1

= 1), the CIA contraint does not bind because the agents are indi¤erent
between spending a unit of money today and holding it for one period. On the other hand,
when the expected return of a unit of money, measured in next periods utility units, is
smaller than the current utility value of a unit of money (i.e Et

 t+1R
M
t+1

< 1), the CIA
constraint binds because agents are not indi¤erent between spending a unit of money today
and holding it for one period; they strongly prefer to spend it today.
Dividing (13) over (14) and using (3) results to:
ul (ct; lt)
uc (ct; lt)
=
1t
1t + 2t
x0it [p
0 (xit)xit + p (xit)]
Ptm
(17)
7Note that rM =   inf = (1 + inf) is non-positive as long as ination is strictly non-negative.
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or

ct
lt
=
1t
1t + 2t
   1

t (18)
When 2t = 0 and the CIA constraint for that perod is not binding, this is the usual intra-
temporal condition which states that the marginal rate substitution (MRS) between leisure
and consumption equals marginal productivity times the inverse of the markup. However,
when the CIA constraint is binding and 2t > 0, the MRS is lower in the case of a nonbinding
CIA constraint, which implies that consumption is less and/or the labor supply larger.
2.3 Equilibrium
There is a sequence of productivity levels and money supplies ft;Mtg1t=1 that evolve ac-
cording to # and  and the initial conditions f1;M1g : Whilst we have treated qt as given
at the household level, we now need to dene the aggrgegate relationship which determines
the velocity of circulation:
Assumption Let us dene a velocity shock 't which has an initial condition '1 and the
conditional p.d.f.  (e';'0) for e' 2   <+ where '0 denotes the previous period
realized value of '. The velocity of circulation is determined by the mapping: qt 2 Qt:
Z+ x  x N x ! (0; qb] which we can write as qt = q(t; t; 't; t):
Thus we allow for a very general set of possibilities about how the velocity is determined:
there is a general function (which may be time specic) which relates the velocity qt to the
two shocks determining t;Mt as well as a possible velocity shock. The assumption allows
for the velocity to be constant, or to be a decreasing or increasing in its arguments and there
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is no requirement for smoothness or di¤erentiability. An equilibrium consists of a sequence
pairs of fwt, Ptg1t=1 that clear the labor and the goods market (notice that w is the real wage
and P is the nominal price of output) given f't; t;Mtg1t=1. Associated with fwt, Pt, t, 't,
vtg1t=1 are the sequences fqt, 1t, 2t, yt, ct, ht, tg1t=1.
We can characterize the equilibrium sequence by dividing it into two possible states: one
where the CIA is binding, and one where it is not. Of course, how this divides up will
depend on the sequence of productivity and monetary shocks. The two extremes are that
the CIA constraint is always binding (as in Cooley and Hansen 1989), or never binding.
The following propositions allow us to determine how the economy behaves in the case of an
intermittently binding CIA.
For all t, the real wage is related to the current productivity level by the markup equation
(8), wt =
 1

t. The nominal price Pt thus becomes the key variable for establishing
equilibrium in each period. A useful way to sort the sequence into binding and non-binding
is to note that there is an upper bound to the velocity of circulation: the CIA constraint
binds only when this upper bound is reached.
Proposition 1 For all t there is an upper bound qb = = (   1) on the equilibrium qt:
The CIA contraint binds at time t when qt = qb and it does not bind at time t when
qt < q
b.8
8Recall that whether the CIA constraint binds or not depends on the expectation about next periods
relative value of money (condition (16)). This expectation is conditional on the current state of the economy.
13
All proofs are in the appendix. This enables us to partition time into two sets: times
when the CIA is binding, and times when it is not binding:
B =t 2 Z+ : qt = qb	 ; NB =t 2 Z+ : qt < qb	
Note that whenever t 2 NB, 2t = 0. However, for t 2 B, 2t  0. Clearly from a
macroeconomic point of view, we are mostly interested in the case where t 2 B and 2t > 0.
Hence, we can dene the subset of B
SB =t 2 Z+ : qt = qb and 2t > 0	
Notice that the upper bound of qt is decreasing with the elasticity of demand of the
consumption good (i.e dqb=d =  1= (   1)2 < 0); equivalently, it is increasing with the
markup of marginal productivity over the real wage. Now, we can dene the proportion of
periods in which the CIA constraint is binding. If we dene
B(T ) =t 2 f1; 2:::Tg : qt = qb	
and likewise NB(T ) and SB(T ). For any T  1 we can dene the proportion of times the
CIA constraint binds:
P(B; T ) = #B(T )
T
The stationarity of the conditional distributions of ,  and ' is su¢ cient to ensure that
limT!1P(B; T ) = {, where { 2 [0; 1].
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Proposition 2 When the CIA constraint binds (t 2 SB) there is a unique equilibrium where
Pt = (1 + t) q
b
h
Mt+t
t
i
with t =

Zt(Mt+t)
>  > 0 and Zt = Et f1t+1 + 2t+1g.
Proposition 2 implies that equilibrium output, consumption, work e¤ort and real prots
are functions of technology innovations, the level of money supply, money tranfers and expec-
tations for next periods technology and velocity-specic innovations and money transfers:
yt =
nm
1 + t
t, ct =
(   1)
 (1 + t)
t,ht =
1
1 + t
, t =
m
 (1 + t)
t
Corollary 1 The CIA constraint strictly binds at time t when Zt (Mt + t) = =t < 1 and
does not bind when Zt (Mt + t) = qb=qt > 1.
Corollary 1 also indicates that the velocity of circulation is related to the expectations
about the future state of the economy via Z since qt = qb=Zt (Mt + t).
Proposition 3 For a given ft;Mt; 'tg1t=1, consider 1 and 2 with corresponding sequences
of equilibria and B1(T ) and B2(T ) for 1 > T  1: If 1 > 2 then B2(T )  B1(T ) .
As the market becomes more competitive (as lim !1

 1 = 1), it is "more likely"
that the CIA constraint will bind (or certainly no less likely). It needs to be stressed that
Proposition 3 does not imply that in a perfectly competitive market the CIA constraint will
always bind. Whilst it is possible that the CIA constraint will be binding all the time9
and NB = ?, it is perfectly possible that in the competitive case the CIA constraint never
9Cooley and Hansen (1989), assume that the consumption good is traded in a perfectly competitive
market. They establish the condition under which the CIA constraint binds and they assume that this
condition is met at all times. This condition is a version of the condition established in corollary 1.
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(strictly) binds (for example, if t andMt are constant) and hence SB = ?. However, what
is clear from the proof of proposition 3 is that for some ft, Mt, 'tg1t=1 and for some pairs
(1; 2), and some T , B2(T )  B1(T ).
Proposition 4 When the CIA constraint does not bind (t 2 NB) there is a unique equilib-
rium where Pt = (1 + ) qt
h
Mt+t
t
i
with qt < qb and  > t.
Corollary 2 When the CIA constraint is non-binding money does not a¤ect real quantities.
Corrolary 2 implies that equilibrium real output, real consumption, work e¤ort and real
prots are functions of only technology innovations:
yt =
nm
1 + 
t, ct =
   1
 (1 + )
t, ht =
1
(1 + )
, t =
m
 (1 + )
t
Note that when the CIA constraint does not bind, changes in money supply a¤ect only the
price level and as proposition 4 and corrolary 2 indicate, expectations have no e¤ect on either
real quantities or the price level.
Proposition 5 For any t1 2 SB and any t2 2 NB such that t1 = t2, u (t2) > u (t1) and
 (t2) >  (t1).
The above proposition states that an equilibrium that occurs at a binding CIA constraint
is inferior, in terms of the current welfare, to any equilibrium that occurs at a non-binding
CIA constraint with the same level of technology. Notice that changes in the monopoly
power, do not directly a¤ect aggregate production as output is not a function of . Never-
theless, changes in monopoly power, change the distribution of aggregate consumption; as
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the monopoly decreases (i.e  increases), the consumption of the workers increases while the
real prots decrease. Then, for time-invariant velocity function and probability distributions
for ,  and ', it becomes more likely that the CIA constraint will bind (proposition 3) which
implies that it becomes more likely that both workers and entrepreneurs will be worse-o¤
(proposition 5).
The intuition behind the real e¤ect of money is that sometimes the CIA constraint binds.
When this happens, the consumer faces a trade-o¤ between consuming less now and holding
more cash in order to benet in the future. This decision is inherently inter-temporal:
it derives from (15) in which equates the current shadow price of money to its expected
value next period. To make matters concrete, for illustrative purposes, let us assume that
the velocity of circulation is an increasing function of  and 10. For a massive monetary
expansion or a substantial technology improvement or a combination of the two, the CIA
constraint will then bind because the agents expect that the value of money next period
will be smaller than the value of money the current period (see condition (16)). As a result,
they rush to spend all their money holdings the current period which increases the velocity
of money to the extent that it hits its upper bound. It follows that the equilibrium output,
consumption, work e¤ort and prots, all depend on the current money supply as well as
expectations for future money transfers and technology innovations.
In general, a higher level of technology would imply a higher welfare. In addition, for any
given technology level, a binding CIA constraint implies a lower welfare than a nonbinding
CIA constraint (proposition 5). A higher level of technology would also imply a higher
10This is a special case of a velocity function where qt = q(t
+
; t
+
).
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probability of a binding CIA contraint (under our illustrative assumption). If the CIA
constraint binds, larger money transfers will, in general, increase the welfare. The monetary
e¤ect on real quantities comes through variable . The smaller  is the higher the welfare
of both consumers and rm owners. There are two channels through which money transfers
can a¤ect , a direct channel in which there is a negative relationship between  and , and
an indirectchanner (through Z) in which the direction of the relationship is not obvious.
The latter depends on the conditional probability distributions of ,  and '. Assuming that
the direct e¤ect of  on  dominates the indirect e¤ect, an increase in the supply of money
decreases  and thereby, increases welfare along a binding CIA constraint.
Note that when the monetary authority decides the transfer t; the values of t and 't
are not known. For a given technology innovation and velocity-specic shock the monetary
authority can increase the likelihood of a binding CIA constraint by transfering a large
amount of money to the agents. A binding CIA constraint can occur even with moderate
levels of technology. If such a case occurs then, according to proposition 5, the welfare for
both rm owners and consumers will deteriorate.11 The monetary authority cannot entirely
prevent the CIA constraint from binding because the condition that determines a binding
CIA constraint does not depend only on  but also on  and ', which are not under the
control of the monetrary authority. One may argue that the monetary authority should
keep money supply constant, making zero transfers, in order to decrease the likelihood of
a binding CIA constraint. Variation in the supply of money however does not necessarily
make the consumers worse o¤. As mentioned above, there might be values of  (within
11If the CIA constraint did not bind utility and real prots would have been higher at the same level of
technology.
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the set of equilibria with binding CIA constraints) that make the agents better o¤. In the
absence of velocity shocks, if there was no time lag between the decision of the transfer
and the realization of technology innovation then the monetary authority could have made
appropriate transfers so that the agents achieve the highest level of welfare for any realization
of .
3 Welfare Improving ExpansionaryMoney Supply: Ex-
ample
For simplicity, we abstract from velocity-specic shocks and assume that velocity is time
invariant (i.e qt 2 Qt: N x  ! (0; qb]). Let  = [1, 2, 3]0 2 <3+ and  = [1, v2, 3]2N3
be vectors containing the possible values of  and , respectively. Specically, 1 < 2 < 3
and 1 < v2 < 3. The 3 x 3 transition matrices of  and  are denoted by # and ,
respectively. Consider the following case:12
state 3, 1 3, 2 3, 3 2, 1 2, 2 2, 3 1, 1 1, 2 1, 3
CIA const. binds yes yes yes no no yes no no no
Notice that having a high  increases the likelihood of a binding CIA constraint which
is a welfare inferior outcome as regards to the current welfare of the agents for any given
level of technology. Nevertheless, the monetary authority will not necessarily choose a low
12Suppose the economy is at state (k; f ) then, Zt (k; f ) = 
P3
j=1
P3
i=1 #kjfj
qb
q(i;j)
1
Mt+vf+j
, where
#ij and ij are the ith, jth elements of matrices # and , respectively. Note also that qt is such that
qt = q
b=Zt(Mt + t) < 1 when the CIA constraint binds and qt = qb > 1 when the CIA constraint does not
bind.
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value of  in order to decrease the probability of a binding CIA constraint. If 3 occurs the
CIA constraint will bind no matter what  is. Then, it could be the case that among the
binding CIA-contraint equilibria,  (3; 3) <  (3; 1) where 1 < 3. The latter implies
that both current prots and current utility are higher under 3 than under 1; as shown in
the proof of proposition 5, du=d < 0 and d=d < 0. Whether  (3; 3) is smaller than
 (3; 1) depends on the expectations about the future state of the economy. Consequently,
there might be a senario where there is a trade o¤ between choosing a low value of  that
reduces the probability of a binding CIA constraint and a high value of  that increases
current welfare among binding CIA-contraint equilibria.
4 Conclusion
The paper lays out a simple framework in a general equilibrium model with money where
the consumption good is produced by monopolistic rms via labor services provided by risk-
averse workers. As in Lucas (1982) and Svensson (1985), money is introduced by means of a
cash-in-advance constraint. Within this framework, we demonstrate that money is a liquidity
vehicle which can have real e¤ects on the economy without requiring the presence of other
real assets or any sort of price rigidity. We allow for a very general function for the velocity
of money which depends on the current state of the economy. When consumers expect that
the value of money will decrease, they rush to spend all their money holdings. Then velocity
reaches its maximum value and the cash-in-advance constraint binds. In this case, both the
current variation of money supply as well as the expected variation of money supply, expected
technology innovations and velocity-specic shocks a¤ect real variables. When consumers
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expect that the value of money will remain unchanged, the cash-in-advance constraint does
not bind as consumers do not spend all their money holdings. In this case, real variables
are driven only by the current technology innovation and money supply variation a¤ects
only the price level. We show that a binding cash-in-advance constraint is a welfare inferior
outcome for both the workers and rm owners as it delivers lower current utility and lower
current real prots for any given level of technology. We also argue that even though the
monetary authority can increase the probability of a binding CIA constraint by increasing
money supply, expansionary monetary policy can be welfare improving.
From a more methodological point of view, we have shown a simple way to introduce
monopolistic competition in a general equilibrium monetary model with divisible labor. The
model can be easily extented in various ways to incorporate other real and nominal assets.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. Suppose the CIA constraint binds. Then, the resource
constraint becomes
yt = nm

Mt
Pt
+
t
Pt

| {z }
CWORKERS
+
1

yt|{z}
CENTREPREUNEURS
which is equivalent to the quantity theory of money equation, Ptyt = qbM t, where qb 
= (   1).
Next, suppose the CIA constraint does not bind; then, 2t = 0. Substituting out Ptct
from (13) using (11), 1t from (14) using (13), wt from (14) using (8) and imposing the
equilibrium condition hst = h
d
t we obtain
Mt+1 =
(1 + ) (   1)
nm
Yt   (   1)Pt

t + [Mt + t]
Using the workers budget constraint the equilibrium consumption can be written as a linear
combination of productivity and real expenditures:
ct =
   1

t      1
nm
yt
It follows that the resource constraint becomes
yt =
nm (   1)

t   (   1)

yt| {z }
CWORKERS
+
1

yt|{z}
CENTREPRENEURS
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The latter and the quantity theory of money equation imply
yt =
nm
1 + 
t , ct =
   1
 (1 + )
t and Pt = (1 + ) qnbt

Mt + t
t

Then, since 0 < Ptct < [Mt + t], it must be the case that
0 <
   1

[Mt + t] q
nb
t < [Mt + t]
which holds only if 0 < qnbt < = (   1)  qb.
Proof of proposition 2. When the CIA contraint binds, equations (8), (9), (13) and
(14) imply
1t =
nm
(   1)Pt [nmt   yt] > 0
2t =
(   1) [nmt   yt]  nm
h
Mt
Pt
+ t
Pt
i
(   1) [Mt + t] [nmt   yt] > 0
Recall that
yt =

   1nm

Mt
Pt
+
t
Pt

(A.1)
which can be rewritten as
Ptyt = q
bM t
Since 1t > 0 and given (A:1), it follows that
Pt > q
b

Mt + t
t

(A.2)
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Likewise, since 2t > 0 it follows that
Pt > (1 + ) q
b

Mt + t
t

(A.3)
Then, (A:2) and (A:3) imply that
Pt = (1 + t) q
b

Mt + t
t

where t >  > 0
Using the latter we can express equilibrium real output, real consumption, work e¤ort
and real prots as functions of t, t and parameters:
yt =
nm
1 + t
t, ct =
   1
 (1 + t)
t, ht =
1
1 + t
, t =
m
 (1 + t)
t
It is straightforward to show that variable t takes a unique value. Recall the euler condition
1t = Et f1t+1 + 2t+1g where
f1t+1 + 2t+1g =
8>><>>:

( 1)(Mt+1+t+1)qt+1 for qt+1 < q
b
1
Mt+1+t+1
otherwise
Therefore, given the probability distributions for  and , the expectation Et f1t+1 + 2t+1g
is well dened. For notational convenience let Zt = Et f1t+1 + 2t+1g. Since
1t =
8>><>>:

( 1)(Mt+t)qt for qt < q
b

t(Mt+t)
otherwise
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then
t =

Zt (Mt + t)
Proof of corollary 1. The euler condition implies that Zt (Mt + t) = qb=qt when the
CIA constraint does not bind and Zt (Mt + t) = =t when the CIA constraint binds. As
shown in the proof of proposition 1, when the CIA constraint does not bind qb > qt and
thereby Zt (Mt + t) > 1. As shown in the proof of proposition 2, when the CIA constraint
binds t >  and thereby Zt (Mt + t) < 1.
Proof of proposition 3. For 1 and 2 the corresponding upper bounds of velocity
are denoted by qb (1) and q
b (2), respectively. Proposition 1 indicates that if 1 > 2 then
qb (1) < q
b (2). It follows that for a given ft;Mt; 'tg1t=1, B2(T )  B1(T ).
Proof of proposition 4. As shown in the proof of proposition 1, when the CIA
constraint is non-binding, qt < qb, equilibrium output and consumption are functions of only
t while the price level is a function of Mt, t, 't and t. Using the solution for output in
(9) and (10), equilibrium work e¤ort and real prots are expressed as functions of only t.
Corollary 1 indicates that when the CIA constraint does not bind Zt (Mt + t) > 1 which
implies that t < .
Proof of corollary 2. It follows from the proof of proposition 4.
Proof of proposition 5. Let unb (t2) 2 Unb = fu (t): t 2 NBg and ub (t1) 2
U b = fu (t): t 2 SBg correspond to nb (t2) and b (t1), respectively. For any  we
know that nb () <  < b (). Then, for a given , as b () decreses, b () ! nb ()
and ub () ! unb (). If ub () increases (decreases) as b () decreases (increases) then
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unb (t2) > u
b (t1). To show this write
ub
 
;b

= ln
   1
 (1 + b)
 +  ln
b
1 + b
,  < b
Since 0 <  < b, it follows that
dub (;)
db
=
  b
b (1 + b)
< 0
and thereby unb (t2) > u
b (t1). In addition, since 0 <  < 
b,
b (t1) =
m
 (1 + b)
t1 <
m
 (1 + )
t2 = 
nb (t2)
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